Dardanelles Patrol Song

DESCRIPTION: "Rolling and patrolling Outside the Dardanelles, Waiting for the Goeben So that we can test our shells. We went up to Chanak, But we very soon came back, Ain't it lovely rolling and patrolling?"
AUTHOR: unknown
EARLIEST DATE: 1987 (Tawney-GreyFunnelLines-RoyalNavy)
KEYWORDS: ship travel navy derivative
HISTORICAL REFERENCES:
1914 - the British navy fails to stop the German ships Goeben and Breslau from fleeing to the Ottoman Empire
FOUND IN: Britain(England(Lond))
REFERENCES (1 citation):
Tawney-GreyFunnelLines-RoyalNavy, p. 76, "Dardanelles Patrol Song" (1 text, tune referenced)
CROSS-REFERENCES:
cf. "Roaming in the Gloaming" (tune)
NOTES [2965 words]: The beginning of World War I saw a tricky situation for the Germans in the Mediterranean. They had no bases there, although their Austrian allies had some. But the Germans had two ships in the area, the battlecruiser Goeben and the light cruiser Breslau. Even with Austrian support, they had no hope against the British and French forces in the area -- but they could potentially do a lot of damage if they could avoid interception and could manage to keep supplied (especially with coal and shells).
Adding to the complexity of the situation was the fact that there were other Mediterranean powers that were still neutral -- Italy, Spain, the Ottoman Empire, and lesser states. Both sides wanted to lure Italy, but she would hold off until 1915. Spain never did get involved. But the Ottoman Empire was a much more complex case. She had long ties with Britain -- but Britain was allied with Russia, and Russia was the long-time enemy of the Ottomans. Plus, in recent years, the Germans had been courting the Ottomans.
And the British definitely started the war on the wrong foot with the Ottomans. The Turks had placed orders with the British for two battleships, with many Turks taking pay cuts and making contributions to enable the ships to be built (Kinross, p. 604). They were dear to Turkish hearts, and they were almost finished. But as the war began, with the Turks about to take possession, the British (who were worried that they did not have an adequate edge in battleships over the German fleet) requisitioned them as HMS Agincourt and HMS Erin (Farquharson-Roberts, pp. 43-44; Palmer, p. 223), causing the Ottomans to become very upset.
The Goeben was still fairly new; she was one of the second group of German battlecruisers, and had been finished in late 1912 (Jane's-WWI, p. 108). With ten 11" guns, an armor belt that was 11" thick, and a nominal speed of 27-28 knots, she was potentially the strongest ship in the Mediterranean. But she wasn't really a credit to German engineering. Sent to the Mediterranean as one of Kaiser Wilhelm's blustery gestures before she had finished her shakedown period, her boilers were a disaster (Marder, pp. 20-21; van der Vat, p. 32) and her hull fouled (Wragg, p. 42). Apart from the badly-made boilers, she also had some problems typical of large German ships, which weren't intended to go much beyond the North Sea: she had a very limited coal supply (according to van der Vat, p. 40, her usual load would only last for 19 hours, or 520 miles, at top speed; even with a full load and low speed, she could manage only about 4000 miles. This was very short for a nominal "cruiser"). Van der Vat, p. 40, adds that she was only marginally habitable; German ships of this era tended to have their crews sleep ashore. And, being designed for northern waters, I suspect she was incredibly hot in warmer climes.
As for her consort the Breslau, she was fast, but with no gun larger than 4.1", she wouldn't scare anything bigger than a destroyer. She was fast, but effectively unarmored and extremely uncomfortable (van der Vat, p. 40; although her tonnage made her a very, very light cruiser, for practical purposes she was a long-range destroyer).
The British could counter the German battlecruiser with three, Inflexible, Infatigable, and Indomitable, all armed with 12" guns, heavier than Goeben's -- but they were the very first generation of British battlecruisers, with a speed of just 25 knots. Plus they were coal-burners that found it hard to keep up their top speed for long (Marder, p. 21). The Battle of Jutland would show that they also had significant weaknesses; no one knew that in 1914, but despite their slightly larger guns it was pretty clear that, individually, they were not superior to Goeben.
If it came to a battle, the Germans also had the better commander in the area; Marder, p. 21, calls German admiral Wilhelm Souchon "alert, energetic, imaginative," while writing off British admiral Sir Archibald Berkeley Milne, known as "Arky Barky," as "utterly lacking in vigour and imagination"; he apparently owed his position to court connections. Similarly, van der Vat, p. 37, says that Souchon was "far and away the best naval commander in the Mediterranean, the most professional, decisive and resolute admiral afloat there, whose quality was accentuated by the unusual capacity for under-achievement of those lined up against him." Whereas "Milne was born with a veritable canteen of silver cutlery in his mouth, in his father's official apartments in the Admiralty building" where the father was Admiral of the Fleet (van der Vat, p. 44). His failings were well known -- Admiral Fisher railed against him -- but somehow no one with power to remove him did anything about it.
So the British, if they were to knock out the Goeben, really needed to catch her with at least two battlecruisers. Could their cranky older ships catch up with the newer, faster, but broken-down German? That was the situation in the early days of August 1914, as everyone started to try to figure out their strategy for the war they had stumbled on.
Making things even more complicated was the breakdown of who was at war with whom. The war had started when the Habsburg Empire of Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. Russia had declared war on the Habsburgs to protect Serbia. The Germans, committed to protect Austria-Hungary, then declared war on Russia -- and then, when France refused to promise neutrality, declared war on and invaded France. The attack on France involved invading neutral Belgium. That caused Britain to issue an ultimatum to Germany to get out of Belgium (Kinross, pp. 602-603). But, in the early days of August, Britain wasn't at war with Austria-Hungary at all (Farquharson-Roberts, p. 43) -- and technically wasn't even at war with Germany; the British would not be at war until the ultimatum expired at the end of August 4, 1914.
The first major Mediterranean operation came as the French set out to move an army corps from North Africa to France (Farquharson-Roberts, p. 44). The Germans of course hoped to interfere, and the British wanted to prevent them from interfering. The Goeben reached the shore of Africa on August 4 -- some hours before the British joined the war -- and fired a few shots before turning away (Wragg, p. 44). The French very possibly might have dealt with the German force, but they showed a lack of initiative that put even the British to shame, and accomplished nothing (the map in the endpapers of van der Vat shows how they all ended up east of the Germans, and they didn't have speed to catch up.)
The Admiralty, under Winston Churchill, was determined to push Milne into action -- and issued him so many orders that it flatly overwhelmed and confused him (Farquharson-Roberts, p. 45; Marder, p.22, especially points to an order not to fight the Germans in the absence of the French). The British actually found Souchon briefly as he withdrew from Africa, but the British ultimatum hadn't quite expired yet, so they didn't open fire (Wragg, p. 44), and couldn't keep up as Souchon went to Messina on August 5 to coal up (Farquharson-Roberts, p. 46; Marder, p. 23).
Because coaling took time, the British could have caught Souchon coming out of the Straits of Messina, but Milne blew his chance; he concentrated on covering the French convoy rather than chasing the Goeben (Marder, p. 24), which was silly -- if he took out the Goeben, then there weren't any ships to attack the convoy! By so doing, Milne abandoned any hopes of confronting Goeben with the battlecruisers that were designed to do the job.
One small cruiser, the Gloucester, however managed to trail the Goeben for a great distance, until Milne ordered her to break off (Marder, p. 29), so the British knew where the enemy was for the two days from August 5 to August 7.
There was still a force in position to intercept Souchon, but it wasn't the British battlecruisers; it was four older "armoured" cruisers, Defence, Warrior, Black Prince, and Duke of Edinburgh, who were around the mouth of the Adriatic (Farquharson-Roberts, p. 46) under the command of Admiral Ernest Troubridge. Defence, the newest (laid down in 1905, which still meant she was almost obsolete) had four 9.2" guns and a bunch of 7.5"; the others, built in 1903 and 1904, had six 9.2" each plus lesser guns (Jane's-WWI, pp. 51-52). But many of the guns were badly sited, and the ships were all slower than Goeben.
The cruisers' guns were too light to pierce Goeben's armored belt, but with luck might do enough damage to other parts of her hull that the heavier British ships might catch her. Particularly since Goeben, which apparently did not have a full wartime complement aboard, had so many men stoking her cranky boilers that she was having trouble manning the guns and other equipment (van der Vat, p. 99).
There has been much debate ever since over whether the four cruisers would have had a chance against Goeben. In a straight-up line-ahead daylight fight against a Goeben with intact boilers and a full supply of coal and sheels, I think the consensus is that they probably wouldn't, but if they had split their forces and let their accompanying destroyers use their torpedoes, they might have been able to make a fight of it, especially if the battle took place at night (since they would be harder to hit in the dark, and their many light guns might give more of an advantage relative to the Goeben's few but heavy guns). Given that the British cruisers were close to obsolete, and wouldn't have been much of a loss if they were destroyed, it might have been worth a try; Farquharson-Roberts, p. 47, for instance, suggests that the British "might have had a significant chance of victory." The British court which examined the matter also felt Troubridge might have won (Marder, p. 33). And Marder, p. 29, points out that Souchon's ships had limited coal and ammunition. The former limited their ability to maneuver; the latter meant that they might well run out of shells before they could deal with all the British ships.
But Admiral Troubridge (a descendent of one of Nelson's captains, but certainly not a man possessed of the Nelson spirit) did not try; he withdrew in the face of what he considered superior force, arguing that the Goeben outranged him (Marder, p. 27) -- which was true, but ignored the fact that guns often miss, especially at long range (for that matter, it ignores that he could have tried to ram); Troubridge could certainly have gotten into range to fight had he wanted to. He didn't. He was court-martialed and acquitted, but his sea career was over (Farquharson-Roberts, p. 47. Van der Vat, p. 151, thinks that the Admiralty wanted to try him on a charge of cowardice, which could have resulted in his execution, but the prosecutor stood up to him and resisted. But the whole set-up was biased by the unfair preliminary examination described on pp. 132-150 of van der Vat. It is certain that Troubridge had asked Milne under what circumstances he should engage the Germans, and gotten no answer, and of course that the Admiralty had given many conflicting orders; clearly Troubridge was sinned against as well as sinning). The Navy continued to employ him, but Marder, p. 36, thinks that they didn't want to admit that they disagreed with his acquittal by the court; they would have dropped him if they could. The ultimate fault, Marder contends on pp. 39-41, was the Admiralty's confused, confusing, and ever-changing orders. The captain of Troubridge's flagship, Fawcet Wray, who had urged an agonized Troubridge to caution, also suffered for his lack of determination (van der Vat, pp. 86-88), though without facing a court (van der Vat, p. 172).
The British still had one more chance. Souchon hadn't managed to get a full load of coal in Messina; on August 9, he had to stop at the island of Denusa, not far from the southern Ottoman coast (Marder, p. 30). This gave Milne and his battlecruisers another chance to catch up. But a staff snarl-up caused an order to be sent to Milne telling him to go off and fight the Austrians (even though the British would not go to war with the Habsburg Empire for another four days; van der Vat, p. 91). The last chance was gone.
On August 10, the Goeben and the Breslau reached the Dardanelles and safety (Palmer, p. 224), since the Ottomans were still neutral. And the Germans had another trick in their bag: They promptly "sold" the ship to the Ottomans to replace the battleships the British had requisitioned. "Sold," as in, the ships took down their German flags and raised Turkish ones (Palmer, p. 225) and started to be known as Yavuz Sultan Selim (the Goeben) and Midilli (the Breslau) The Ottomans declared that they "were to take the place of the two ships of which perfidious Britain had robbed her" (Kinross, p. 604).
The ships had changed their names, but not their crews (although they started to wear fezes); they were still, for practical purposes, German warships. And the Germans got another benefit: the Turks had no naval tradition, so they had been in the habit of seconding foreign admirals as their own naval commander. And so Admiral Souchon became head of the Turkish navy, replacing British Admiral Limpus (Palmer, p. 225). Which meant that, as soon as the Ottomans joined the war, Souchon was able to do whatever he wanted with his ships, just as if he had been still serving Germany! And the mere fact that the Ottomans now had German ships in their command inevitably pushed them toward the German side -- indeed, Marder, p. 41, thinks it was the decisive factor in causing the Ottomans to join the Central Powers -- though the two nations had actually already formed an alliance (van der Vat, p. 28); it would probably be more correct to say that it forced the Ottomans to admit that they were on the German side.
The result in a way resembled a siege: Milne left the Mediterranean on August 18, but he left two of his battlecruisers to watch the straits (Marder, p. 31). The Goeben couldn't come out of the Dardanelles (at least on the Mediterranean side; she was free to go into the Black Sea, and did, attacking Sebastopol in October; van der Vat, p. 11), but the British couldn't stop blockading the strait, lest she come out. Hence this song, telling of the monotonous British blockade the German ship inspired. She had no real effect on the further course of the war, but in her role as a "fleet in being," she certainly influenced the planning of the Dardanelles campaign of 1915.
Milne expected to get a higher command on going home, but was disappointed; the Admiralty canceled his appointment -- in effect, relieving him. They retired him in 1921, without giving him another substantial command (Marder, p. 31-32) -- although, unlike Troubridge, he did not face a court.
Van der Vat devotes dozens of pages to the court cases and studies, and is surprisingly sympathetic to Troubridge -- he thinks the Admiralty's constant contradictions and Milne's slow and unhelpful orders left Troubridge to make decisions he should not have had to make. And he believes that Troubridge's conclusion -- that he had been ordered to avoid a fight with a superior force, and that the Goeben was probably a superior force -- was reasonable. His conclusion on p. 179, though, is "We may legitimately conclude that Milne was in fact as much to blame as Troubridge and the Admiralty. But when all is said and done there is no escape from the judgment that Rear-Admiral Ernest Troubridge should have had a go."
And if Troubridge had had a go, there might have been no reason for this song to be written.
The French also conducted an investigation, years later (discussed on pp. 123-131 of van der Vat); it was never even published, since both the French admiral and the French Minister of Marine were long since gone. Based on what we know of it, it seems to have been scathing, but it made no difference; the French navy had had its one real chance to do something useful in the war, and blown it; it would not have another.
The German ships didn't ever face the British or French again, but they did go out to face the Russians -- attacking the Russians while pretending to be attacked, based on an order that hadn't been approved by the Ottoman government. Since this involved the Russians with the Ottomans, it pushed the Ottomans to give up their neutrality and join the Central Powers (van der Vat, pp. 187-190). It's not often that two ships can change the course of a World War. Considering how severe were British losses in the Dardanelles and other battles with the Turks, it was a true coup for the Germans.
The British quest to catch the Goeben/Yavuz ultimately accomplished absolutely nothing. The German ships mostly stayed in the Dardanelles, not making any attempts to fight the British. In January 1918, they made a small sally, and fought a few British ships, sinking two monitors (van der Vat, pp. 220-224) -- but both German ships hit mines, and the Breslau sank as a result (van der Vat, pp. 225-226). The Yavuz, which wasn't as hard-hit, survived the war. When the Ottoman Empire fell, the new Turkish state was able to keep her -- indeed, when Kemal Atatürk, the founder of Turkey, died, she carried him to his last resting place (van der Vat, p. 232). She survived World War II, too, and was not finally scrapped until the 1970s (Worth, p. 271). I believe this made her the last battlecruiser -- certainly the last German battlecruiser, and the last World War I battlecruiser -- in service.
Marder, Map 2, shows the Goeben's peregrinations, and van der Vat's endpapers show the movements of the various ships chasing her. . - RBW
BibliographyLast updated in version 6.5
File: Tawn058

Go to the Ballad Search form
Go to the Ballad Index Song List

Go to the Ballad Index Instructions
Go to the Ballad Index Bibliography or Discography

The Ballad Index Copyright 2024 by Robert B. Waltz and David G. Engle.