Rifleman's Song at Bennington

DESCRIPTION: "Why come ye hither, redcoats? Your mind what madness fills?" The singer warns the British soldiers of danger in America. They are asked if there are no graves in Britain for them. He promises a quick death "If flint and trigger hold but true."
AUTHOR: Words: John Allison / Music traditional, set by John Allison
EARLIEST DATE: 1962 (recording, Pete Seeger)
KEYWORDS: battle patriotic
HISTORICAL REFERENCES:
Aug 16, 1777 - Battle of Bennington
Oct 17, 1777 - Surrender of John Burgoyne at Saratoga
FOUND IN: US
REFERENCES (4 citations):
Cohen-AmericanFolkSongsARegionalEncyclopedia1, pp. 25-26, "RIflemen's Song at Bennington" (1 text)
Botkin-TreasuryOfNewEnglandFolklore, pp. 543-544, "Rifleman's Song at Bennington" (1 text, 1 tune)
Silber/Silber-FolksingersWordbook, p. 280, "The Riflemen At Bennington" (1 text)
DT, RIFLEBEN*
RECORDINGS:
Pete Seeger, "Riflemen of Bennington" (on PeteSeeger32)
CROSS-REFERENCES:
cf. "The Fate of John Burgoyne" (subject: the Saratoga campaign) and notes there
NOTES [1067 words]: Recorded by John and Lucy Allison. There is no reason to believe this song ever circulated in oral tradition. Those interested in other non-traditional poetry about Bennington might wish to consult William L. Stone, Ballads and Poems Relating to the Burgoyne Campaign, 1893 (I use the 1970 Kennikat Press reissue), pp. 215-233, which contains eight pieces about Bennington.
The Battle of Bennington was part of John Burgoyne's campaign that ended at Saratoga, for which see "The Fate of John Burgoyne." Burgoyne had a long supply train, running back all the way to Canada, and he really didn't have all that he needed for the campaign. So he was forced to forage to supply his troops: "Confronted by shortages of all sorts, except ammunition, Burgoyne listened to [Baron von] Riedesel's proposal to send an expedition as far east as the Connecticut River to forage for cattle and horses. Riedesel recommended that a large body be sent out in the expectation that it would return with meat for the troops and mounts for his horseless Brunswick dragoons. These Germans had found the march to Fort Edward [just north of Saratoga] a torture. Burgoyne... needed food, and he knew that bringing it from Ticonderoga [at the north end of Lake George, dozens of miles away through hostile country] would be almost impossible" (Middlekauff, p. 377).
Choosing to raid Vermont, Burgoyne ordered Lt. Colonel Friedrich Baum -- a German who spoke no English! (Middlekauff, p. 377; Purcell, p. 20; Lancaster, p. 213, hints that this not only made it harder to talk to Americans they passed but even to deal with his own Indian allies) -- to take somewhere between 500 and 750 men to raid the Colonial supply center at Bennington. (Purcell, p. 20, estimates that Baum had 375 German mercenaries, 300 Canadians, Indians, and Tories, and just 50 British regulars; Jameson, p. 60, estimates 500 in Baum's force and 500 reinforcements). The Germans, being cavalrymen but having no horses, were weighed down with more equipment than infantry would have carried, and so moved slowly (Lancaster, p. 213). About twenty miles southeast of Saratoga, Bennington was the farthest British units advanced into the American colonies in the Saratoga campaign (see map on p. 375 of Middlekauff).
The colonial leader John Stark -- a good soldier (he had been a senior officer at Bunker Hill) although one who seemed constitutionally incapable of working with others (Purcell, p. 20; Marrin, p. 132, thinks he only rejoined the colors because he had heard an atrocity story) is believed to have had about 2000 men, although they were poorly organized (almost all were militia, which in the Revolutionary War translated as "individuals with guns who came and went as they pleased." Lancaster, p. 214, says that it was an army raised by New Hampshire, not the general colonial army, and raised mostly by one man, John Langdon). When Baum came in contact with these semi-soldiers, he dug in and called for reinforcements, but although Burgoyne sent about 600 men under Lt. Col. Heinrich Breymann, they were slow to arrive (Purcell, p. 21; Lancaster, p. 214, says they were slowed by rain that turned the roads to mud, plus Breymann kept insisting on parade formations, which meant that they could only move about half a mile an hour).
While waiting for them, Baum built defensive positions, but they were not mutually supporting (Purcell, p. 21). And Baum seems not to have realized that the men in civilian clothes who were coming closer and closer were in fact soldiers. He held his fire until they had in effect infiltrated and surrounded his position (Marrin, p. 132). They opened fire at close range, meaning that Baum's artillery was no help; he was surrounded by enemies who outnumbered him heavily.
The irregulars (Canadians, Indians, Tories) quickly fled, leaving Baum's regulars to keep fighting. The Germans eventually ran short of ammunition, and tried to cut their way out -- but then Baum was killed by a bullet to the head, and most of the remaining British and German forces surrendered.
When Breymann arrived, there was no one to reinforce, so he got into his own fight with the Americans. When he decided he had to retreat, it turned into a rout, although many of his men, unlike Baum's, made it back to Burgoyne. Purcell, p. 21, estimates British losses as 200 dead and 700 captured; American losses were less than 100. Jameson, p. 60, gives 207 British killed, 700 captured (so also Marrin, p. 134), 60-70 who returned to camp, against American losses of 14 killed, 42 wounded. Marrin, p. 134 says there were 30 American dead, 4 wounded (which is not a credible ratio, but the total could be right). Lancaster, p. 214, thinks Burgoyne lost 800 Germans -- perhaps his steadiest troops. Cook, p. 276, thinks the total was 900 lost -- 10% of the professionals in Burgoyne's army.
Which left Burgoyne having to decide what to do next. He hadn't gotten his supplies, after all, and his army was now significantly weaker. "[I]t is unlikely that Burgoyne would have halted his advance after Bennington to spend the winter in northern New York or to return to Canada. He was too proud and too savvy a political soldier.... Nevertheless, with his army now seriously weakened and his supply situation growing more precarious, he began messaging frantically to [General Henry] Clinton in New York [who was supposed to be approaching from the south to combine armies with Burgoyne]" (Cook, pp. 276-277).
Bennington had very nearly doomed Burgoyne's expedition. "The British were not isolated, whatever else they felt about their situation. But they were at a critical juncture and Burgoyne knew it. He had about a month's supply of food and his troops were in fairly good shape. They were far from the magazine on Lake Champlain, however, and with rather short supplies and lacking winter quarters they could not remain where they were -- on the east side of the Hudson and not close to Albany. Burgoyne might have pulled back to Ticonderoga, but he was averse to withdrawal, which everyone would have considered an admission of defeat. [Which, given his boasts earlier, would surely have cost him his job, and meant political trouble in London.] So he boldly and bravely decided to continue his drive to Albany" (Middlekauff, p. 377). He headed on -- into the arms of the American army of Horatio Gates and Benedict Arnold. - RBW
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